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Abstract. We consider the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable evolutionary
games (coordination games), and examine how they are affected by spatial structure.
A semiclassical approximation based on a path integral method is applied to stochastic
evolutionary game dynamics with and without spatial structure, and the lifetimes of
the metastable states are evaluated. It is shown that the population dependence of
the lifetimes is qualitatively different in these two models. Our result indicates that
spatial structure can accelerate the transitions between metastable states.
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1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory provides a mathematical framework for analyzing conflicts
of interests between individuals. The theory is based on the principle of evolution,
i.e. strategies that perform well in the population increase their abundance but
those perform poorly are wiped out. It has been applied in many disciplines such
as social sciences [1, 2] and evolutionary biology [3, 4, 5]. Recently, methods developed
in statistical physics have been utilised in researches of this interdisciplinary field
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
Evolutionary game theory has often been formulated by a deterministic process
by assuming an infinitely large population [5, 11]. For example, replicator dynamics
describe the deterministic change of frequencies of strategies [12]. Resulting dynamics
are, in most cases, frequency-dependent, which means that a winning strategy depends
on the current distribution of strategies in the population.
More recently, stochastic models have been applied to analyze evolutionary game
dynamics in a finite population [4, 13]. Examples include evolutionary game-theoretic
versions of the Wright-Fisher and Moran processes [14, 15], which are historically known
as models in population genetics [16]. Analyses of stochastic models reveal the effect
of various random factors, such as demographic stochasticity or recursive mutations, on
game dynamics.
One of the most important applications of stochastic game dynamics is the study of
transitions among multiple “metastable states” that would correspond to fixed points
(hence equilibria) in a deterministic description. A metastable state of a stochastic
process is a state where the system stays for a sufficiently long time. By applying
stochastic game dynamics and examining which metastable state has the longest lifetime,
one can reveal which metastable state is most likely to be realised [4, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
Another dimension of studies in evolutionary game theory is the incorporation
of spatial structure into the model to explore the interplay between game and space
[6, 9, 22, 23, 24]. There are numerous studies in this direction, which suggest that the
speed of evolution as well as its outcome can be significantly influenced by the presence
of spatial structure.
In this paper, we study how spatial structure affects the transition between
metastable states in a class of evolutionary games called coordination games [17]. In
coordination games, there are two strategies, A and B. The payoff of an A-individual
is higher when matched with another A-individual than when matched with a B-
individual. Similarly, the payoff of a B-individual is higher when matched with another
B-individual than when matched with an A-individual. Cooperative hunting is one
biological example of such games, where two hunters hunt either prey A or B; hunting the
same prey together greatly improves the success, so coordination is the better strategy.
This game has bistability, because both the all-A state (= everyone adopts strategy
A) and the all-B state (=everyone adopts strategy B) are stable fixed points of the
deterministic evolutionary game dynamics. When a small “mutation”, i.e. a small
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chance that the individuals will randomly change their strategy, is introduced, the two
states (A-dominant and B-dominant) are realized as metastable states and transitions
between them may occur, i.e. they have finite lifetimes. When the system is large, such
transitions are extremely rare.
To evaluate the lifetimes of metastable states, we adopt a semiclassical (WKB)
approximation [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30], which is an analog of the WKB approximation
used in quantum mechanics. This method is known to be suitable for evaluating the
probability of rare events caused by large fluctuations [30], because it can appropriately
take into account an exponentially small tail of probability distribution beyond
the Gaussian fluctuation considered in the Fokker-Planck approximation or the van
Kampen expansion [31]. The semiclassical approximation has been used for evaluating
the probabilities of rare events in the context of extinction phenomena in ecology
[32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. For evolutionary games, although it has been applied to the analysis
of fixation [10], transition between metastable states, especially how it is affected by
spatial structure, has not been studied well so far.
Here we consider spatial effect on the transition between metastable states in
coordination games. To investigate the spatial effect, we analyze two types of
evolutionary game models: (i) a model without any spatial structure (the “well-mixed”
model), and (ii) a model with one-dimensional spatial structure (the “spatial” model).
For each model, we calculate the lifetime of each metastable state, (which will be defined
in section 2.3,) based on the semiclassical approximation, and discuss the effect of spatial
structure by comparing them. We show that the spatial structure qualitatively changes
the population size dependence of the lifetimes, and that this change is caused by the
presence of nucleation processes, i.e. by transitions that occur via a “critical nucleus”
allowed only in the spatial model. In addition, we clarify that nucleation processes
can occur only when the system’s length exceeds a characteristic length. Although we
demonstrate the spatial effect using a specific model, qualitatively the same result is
expected to hold for general bistable evolutionary games.
This paper is organized as follows: In sections 2 and 3, we evaluate the lifetimes of
the metastable states for the well-mixed and the spatial models, respectively. In section
4, by comparing the lifetimes in the two models, we discuss the spatial effect as well
as its intuitive description. Section 5 concludes the paper. The readers who are less
interested in the details of the calculations may directly proceed to section 2.1, 3.1, and
4.
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2. The well-mixed model
In this section, we consider the transitions between metastable states in a model without
spatial structure (“well-mixed model”). The analysis and discussion presented in this
section provide an important basis for studying spatial effect in the following sections.
We define the model in section 2.1, and in section 2.2, we consider the dynamics
of the expectation value of the number (or proportion) of the strategy-A individuals,
and confirm the bistability of the model. We evaluate the lifetimes of the metastable
states by the path integral method and the semiclassical approximation in section 2.3,
and discuss their model parameter dependence in section 2.4.
2.1. Model
Let us assume that we have a population composed of N(≫ 1) individuals, n of which
follow strategy A, and N−n of which follow strategy B. We assume that the population
is well-mixed, i.e. all the individuals play games with all the other individuals.
We describe the games performed between the individuals by a payoff matrix(
a b
c d
)
, (1)
which specifies payoffs of the games in the following manner: The game between two A
individuals gives both of them a payoff a. The game between an A individual and a B
individual gives them payoffs b and c respectively. The game between two B individuals
gives both of them a payoff d. Then, when the number of A individuals is n, the
respective average payoff of A and B individuals are ΠA(n/N) and ΠB(n/N), where
ΠA(q) := qa+ (1− q) b, ΠB(q) := qc+ (1− q) d. (2)
Here, q := n/N is the proportion of the A individuals in the population (note that
we allowed self-interaction for simplicity). In this paper, we consider only a bistable
“coordination game”, i.e. impose the following conditions:
a > c, b < d. (3)
The condition means that, to get higher payoff, it is always better to play the same
strategy as the opponent.
As an update rule, we adopt a “pairwise comparison process” [37, 38]. In this
process, two individuals, called a focal individual and a role individual, are selected
randomly at a rate λ. The focal individual adopts the strategy of the role individual
with probability p(∆Π) := (1 + w∆Π)/2, (where ∆Π := Πr − Πf , and Πf and Πr are
the payoffs of the focal and role individuals respectively). The parameter w controls
the effect of the payoffs on the spread of strategies, and is hence called “the intensity
of selection”. Thus the strategy yielding a higher payoff is more likely to be imitated
by others. We assume w ∈ [0, 1] and 0 < a − c < 1, 0 < d − b < 1 to guarantee
p(∆Π) ∈ [0, 1].
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characters meaning
λ the rate at which strategy update occurs
w the intensity of selection (w ∈ [0, 1])
µA mutation probability from A to B
µB mutation probability from B to A
a, b, c, d elements of the payoff matrix
Table 1. Parameters used in the well-mixed model.
To avoid fixation, we introduce mutations (i.e. the possibility that imitation fails):
If the role individual is A (resp. B), the focal individual adopts strategy B (resp. A)
with a small probability µA (resp. µB). We assume that the mutation rates are so small
that the dynamics of the expectation value of n remains bistable (see section 2.2).
The parameters used in the present paper are summarized in table 1.
We define the transition rates for the processes, in which the number of A
individuals increase or decrease by one, as λW+(n/N) and λW−(n/N), respectively,
where W± are dimensionless transition rates. By adopting the update rule described
above, W± are given as follows:
W+(q) := (1− µA)q (1− q) 1 + w [ΠA(q)−ΠB(q)]
2
+
µB
2
(1− q)2 , (4)
W−(q) := (1− µB)q (1− q) 1 + w [ΠB(q)−ΠA(q)]
2
+
µA
2
q2. (5)
The system is then described by a continuous time Markov process with these transition
rates. Note that these transition rates depend on payoff matrix elements only through
a− c and d− b because
ΠA(q)−ΠB(q) = (a− c+ d− b)q − (d− b). (6)
The master equation for P (n, t), the probability that the number of A is n at time t,
can be written as
∂tP (n, t) = λW+
(
n− 1
N
)
P (n− 1, t) + λW−
(
n+ 1
N
)
P (n+ 1, t)
−
[
λW+
( n
N
)
+ λW−
( n
N
)]
P (n, t). (7)
2.2. Deterministic dynamics of the expectation value
Let us first consider the dynamics of the expectation value of n, which we denote by
〈n(t)〉. In the limit N → ∞, the stochastic fluctuations can be neglected and 〈n(t)〉
obeys the deterministic equation
d
dt
〈n(t)〉 = λ [W+(〈n(t)〉/N)−W−(〈n(t)〉/N)] . (8)
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Figure 1. The phase portrait of (9), the deterministic dynamics of the well-mixed
model. Here, q is the proportion of A individuals in the system. The full circles denote
fixed points, the dashed lines denote W+(q)−W−(q), and arrows on the axis indicate
the flow of q. It can be seen that q1 and q3 are stable and that q2 is unstable. Thus,
the system exhibits bistability. Parameters: a − c = 0.4, d − b = 1.0, w = 0.5, µA =
µB = 0.01
It is convenient to introduce the new variable q := n/N , which represents the
proportion of A in the population, and rewrite the equation as, with dimensionless time
τ := λt/N ,
d
dτ
〈q(τ)〉 = W+(〈q(τ)〉)−W−(〈q(τ)〉). (9)
For the model considered here, W+(q)−W−(q) is a cubic function of q:
W+(q)−W−(q) = q(1− q)
{
w
(
1− µA + µB
2
)
[(a− b− c+ d)q + b− d] + µB − µA
2
}
+
µB
2
(1− q)2 − µA
2
q2 (10)
Figure 1 shows a graph of W+(q)−W−(q) and the flow of q determined by (9).
The fixed points of the deterministic equation (9) are determined by the condition
W+(q)−W−(q) = 0, i.e. the transition rates of both processes balance. For coordination
games (a > c, b < d) without mutation (µA = µB = 0), it can be easily shown that
the system has three fixed points: two stable fixed points q1 = 0 (= everyone adopts
strategy B) and q3 = 1 (= everyone adopts strategy A) , and one unstable fixed point
q2 = (d− b)/(a− c+ d− b) (= mixture of strategy A and B). The positions of the fixed
points shift slightly when small mutations are introduced. However, the system remains
bistable, i.e. it has two stable fixed points (q1 and q3) and one unstable fixed point (q2)
in the range [0, 1] (see figure 1). Hereafter, we assume that the mutation rates µA and
µB are sufficiently small so that the system remains bistable.
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dominated by A (   )
dominated by B (   )
Figure 2. Time evolution of q := n/N (the proportion of A individuals in the
population) obtained by a Monte Carlo simulation of (7), the stochastic dynamics of
the well-mixed model. Dashed lines denote q1, q2 and q3. The system clearly exhibits
metastability: though the system stays around the metastable states (B-dominant state
q1 or A-dominant state q3) for a long time, it occasionally undergoes transition between
these states. Parameters: N = 50, a− c = d− b = 0.5, w = 0.4, µA = µB = 0.01. For
these parameters, the positions of the metastable states are q1 ≃ 0.0259, q3 ≃ 0.974.
2.3. Transitions between metastable states
As discussed above, the expectation value of n exhibits bistability. In addition, as can
be seen from the definition of the model, fixation to one strategy is impossible because
of mutations. Thus, although the system remains at states q1 or q3 for an extremely
long time, large fluctuations can occasionally carry the system from one state to the
other. Therefore, states q1 and q3 are metastable and have a long but finite lifetime.
To demonstrate this feature, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation of the
stochastic process described by the master equation (7) based on the Gillespie algorithm
[39]. We show an example of stochastic time evolution of the number of A individuals for
N = 50 in figure 2, which shows that while the system stays around the two stable fixed
points (q1 and q3) for a long time, there are rare transitions between these two metastable
states due to stochastic fluctuations. These transitions are expected to be very rare when
N is large, because fluctuations around metastable states are suppressed.
In this paper, we evaluate the lifetimes of these metastable states, which are defined
to be the mean waiting times until the system escapes from the given metastable state
and undergoes transition to the other metastable state. In the following, we mainly
focus on the lifetime of the metastable state q3, because the lifetime of the metastable
state q1 can be calculated in the same manner.
2.3.1. Path integral expression The lifetime of the metastable state q3 is calculated
from Pq3,wm(T ), the probability that the system stays around q3 from τ = 0 to
τ = T (≫ 1) without ever visiting the other metastable state q1. Pq3,wm(T ) decays
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exponentially with T , and the inverse of the decay rate gives the lifetime of q3.
Pq3,wm(T ) can be approximated by the probability that q(T ) = q3 and q(τ) 6=
q1(∀τ ∈ [0, T ]) given that q(0) = q3. We express the latter probability using the path
integral formulation of stochastic processes [30, 40], in which the probability of given
paths can be expressed as a summation, with some weight, over the paths. With this
technique, we obtain (see Appendix A for the derivation)
Pq3,wm(T ) ≃
∫ ′
q(0)=q3,q(T )=q3
DqDp e−NS[q(·),p(·)], (11)
S[q(·), p(·)] :=
∫ T
0
dτ [p(τ)∂τq(τ)−H0(q(τ), p(τ))], (12)
H0(q, p) := (e
p − 1)W+(q) + (e−p − 1)W−(q), (13)
where W± are given by (4) and (5), p is a new variable conjugate to q, and∫ ′
q(0)=q3,q(T )=q3
DqDp represents the (restricted) summation over all the paths (q, p)
satisfying q(0) = q(T ) = q3 and q(τ) 6= q1(∀τ ∈ [0, T ]). The meaning of this expression
is that the probability density of each path q(·), p(·) is exp(−NS[q(·), p(·)]), and that
the desired probability is a weighted sum over all paths satisfying the conditions. Note
that the present formalism is an analog of the path integral in quantum mechanics.
From this analogy, S and H0 are called an action and a Hamiltonian, respectively. The
path integral expression is useful for the analysis of N ≫ 1 cases as discussed in the
next section.
2.3.2. Semiclassical approximation We will now evaluate the path integral expression
(11) under the assumptionN ≫ 1. We adopt a semiclassical approximation, in which the
path integral is approximated by contribution from the stationary paths (q, p) of action
S (i.e. δS[q, p] = 0) and the fluctuations around them because, when N is large, only
the stationary paths contribute dominantly to the path integral. This approximation is
an extension of the steepest descent method in evaluating integrals, and an analog of
the WKB (or semiclassical) approximation in quantum mechanics. It is known that the
semiclassical approximation is suitable for treating rare events [30].
The stationary condition δS = 0 yields differential equations:
dq
dτ
=
∂H0
∂p
= ep W+(q)− e−p W−(q), (14)
dp
dτ
= − ∂H0
∂q
= −(ep − 1)W ′+(q)− (e−p − 1)W ′−(q), (15)
(where W ′±(q) := dW±(q)/dq) subjected to the boundary conditions q(0) = q(T ) = q3
and the condition q(τ) 6= q1(∀τ ∈ [0, T ]). Because the equations have the same form as
Hamilton’s equations of motion in analytical mechanics, the solutions (q, p) satisfying
these differential equations are called “classical” trajectories in the following discussion.
Figure 3 shows phase portraits of the flow of these equations. Note that H0(q, p) is
conserved along each trajectory.
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Figure 3. Phase portraits of the equations of motion (14) and (15). q is the
fraction of A individuals in the system, and p is a variable conjugate to q. The
arrows indicate the flows of (14) and (15), three green circles denote fixed points,
and colored curves show the contours of the Hamiltonian. Left: Bold lines denote
activation trajectories pa (see (16)) Right: Bold lines denote closed trajectories
that determine the lifetimes of the metastable states. The red trajectory (right)
determines the lifetime of q3, while the blue trajectory (left) determines the lifetime
of q1. The area shaded in red (right) is equal to Sq3,wm (see (17)). Parameters:
a− c = 0.4, d− b = 1.0, w = 0.5, µA = µB = 0.01
There are two important types of trajectories. The first one is the trajectories on
the horizontal line of p = 0. These trajectories represent the dynamics of the expectation
value of q, because the equation of motion (14) for p = 0 coincides with the equation of
〈q〉 (9). Note that H0(q, p) = 0 for these trajectories.
The second one is the trajectories shown by bold lines in the left panel of
figure 3, connecting stable fixed points ((q1, 0) and (q3, 0)) and unstable fixed point
((q2, 0)). These two trajectories are called “activation trajectories” [29, 34]. Because
the Hamiltonian is always constant on the connected trajectories, H0(q, p) = 0 holds
on the activation trajectories. Hence, the shape of the activation trajectories can be
collectively expressed as p = pa(q), where
pa(q) := − log
[
W+(q)
W−(q)
]
, (16)
which can be obtained from the condition H(q, pa(q)) = 0 (see (13)).
In the semiclassical approximation of Pq3,wm, classical trajectories should be
properly chosen so that the conditions q(0) = q(T ) = q3 and q(τ) 6= q1 (∀τ ∈ [0, T ]) are
satisfied. Therefore, the classical trajectories relevant for the evaluation of Pq3,wm are
restricted to (i) a trivial solution q(τ) ≡ q3, and (ii) nontrivial solutions circulating on
the closed trajectory shown in the right panel of figure 3 (the red closed trajectory), i.e.
the closed trajectory composed of an activation trajectory and a p = 0 trajectory. Note
that only these trajectories spend significant amount of time in going around and can
satisfy the boundary conditions q(0) = q(T ) = q3 for T ≫ 1. These solutions are called
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“bounce solutions” [30].
The action of the trivial solution is zero, whereas the action of nontrivial solutions
are given by nSq3,wm, where n(= 1, 2, 3, · · ·) is the number of rotation and Sq3,wm is the
action per one cyclic motion on the closed trajectory described above. Using the zero-
energy condition H0(q, p) = 0 and the expression for the activation trajectories pa(q),
Sq3,wm can be expressed as
Sq3,wm =
∫ q2
q3
pa(q)dq, (17)
which is equal to the area shaded in red in the right panel of figure 3. Summing up all
the contributions from the bounce solutions, we obtain
Pq3,wm(T ) ≃
∞∑
n=0
∫ t2
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ T
0
dtn
(−Ke−NSq3,wm)n
= exp
(−Ke−NSq3,wmT ) . (18)
Here, the prefactor K is a positive value determined by Gaussian integrals around
bounce solutions.
Thus, the lifetime of the metastable state q3, τq3,wm, can be expressed as
τq3,wm ≃
1
K
exp(NSq3,wm). (19)
The lifetime of the other metastable state q1 can be evaluated in the same manner,
except that the other closed trajectory (the blue trajectory in the right panel of figure
3) should be used:
τq1,wm ≃
1
K ′
exp (NSq1,wm) , (20)
Sq1,wm :=
∫ q2
q1
pa(q)dq, (21)
where the prefactor K ′ is a positive quantity (determined by Gaussian integrals around
bounce solutions around q1).
It can be seen from (19) and (20) that the lifetimes are extremely long (τqi,wm ≫ 1)
under the condition N ≫ 1 assumed in this paper. The lifetimes strongly depend on the
action Sqi,wm because of the presence of a large factor N in the exponent. In this paper,
we focus on the exponent of the lifetimes, and neglect the weak parameter dependence
of the prefactors K and K ′.
2.4. Result
In this section, we briefly summarize parameter dependence of the lifetime τqi,wm (i ∈
{1, 3}).
2.4.1. N dependence Because action Sqi,wm is positive and independent of N , the
lifetimes τqi,wm ∝ exp(NSqi,wm) (i ∈ {1, 3}) increases exponentially with N . This
result is consistent with the previous one, which showed that the fixation probability
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Figure 4. w dependence of Sq1,wm and Sq3,wm. Sqi,wm increases with w. Parameters:
a− c = 0.4, d− b = 1.0, µA = µB = 0.005.
in the coordination game decays exponentially with N [41]. This kind of exponential
dependence of some “lifetimes” on population size is known for various models in which
the population is well-mixed. Examples include ecological models (the mean time to the
extinction of a population) [34, 35, 42], evolutionary games (the mean time to fixation
in anti-coordination games) [10] and general reaction models [29].
2.4.2. w dependence Figure 4 shows Sq1,wm and Sq3,wm as the functions of w (the
intensity of selection). As can be seen from the figure, the action grows with w. This
result indicates that, when N ≫ 1, the lifetimes τqi,wm ∝ exp(NSqi,wm) (i ∈ {1, 3})
increase rapidly as natural selection becomes strong.
2.4.3. Payoff matrix dependence As can be seen from (4)-(6), the stochastic dynamics
of the evolutionary game considered here depends on payoff matrix elements only
through a− c and d− b. The dependence of Sq1,wm and Sq3,wm on these two parameters
is shown in figure 5 (only the region 0.2 < a − c < 0.8 and 0.2 < d − b < 0.8 is
plotted because outside this region there are parameter sets for which the system is not
bistable).
This dependence can be intuitively explained in the following manner: The larger
a−c is, the more advantageous A individuals is in population dominated by A, compared
with B individuals in the same population, and the longer the lifetime of q3. Almost
the same discussion applies to d− b and the lifetime of q1. Note that when µA = µB, a
symmetry relation Sq1,wm(a− c, d− b) = Sq3,wm(d− b, a− c) holds.
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Figure 5. The payoff matrix dependence of Sq1,wm(left) and Sq3,wm(right).
Parameters: w = 0.8, µA = µB = 0.005
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Figure 6. A schematic diagram of the spatial model. The small circles denote
individuals (Red: A individuals, Blue: B individuals). Individuals play games and
reproduce inside each patch, and can move between neighbouring patches.
3. Spatial model
On the basis of the analysis presented in the previous section, in this section we examine
the transition between metastable states in a model with spatial structure (“spatial
model”). The discussion proceeds almost parallel to that of the previous section.
The model is defined in section 3.1. In section 3.2, we analyze the behaviour of the
expectation value, and determine steady states and their stability. In section 3.3, we
evaluate the lifetimes of metastable states using the path integral expression and the
semiclassical approximation. In section 3.4, we show how these lifetimes depend on the
system size.
3.1. Model
We consider a one-dimensional array of M patches. Let l be the separation between
neighbouring patches and L˜ := Ml be the length of the system. We impose a periodic
boundary condition. In each patch, there are Np(≫ 1) individuals, who take either
strategy A or strategy B, and change their strategies according to the same evolutionary
game as described in section 2. We further assume that the individuals can move
between neighbouring patches. This migration process is modeled as the “swapping” of
individuals so that the number of individuals per patch is conserved.
Let ni be the number of A individuals in the ith patch (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}). The
parameters of the evolutionary rule in each patch are the same as those described in
section 2 (see table 1). The transition rates of ni due to strategy update can be written
as λW+(ni/Np) and λW−(ni/Np), where W± are given in (4) and (5), respectively.
Migration (swapping) processes are defined as follows: A pair of neighbouring
patches, i and j, is randomly chosen at a rate σ. One individual is randomly picked up
from each patch and they are swapped. The rate of the process (ni, nj)→ (ni−1, nj+1)
due to swapping is given by σWm(nj/Np, nj/Np), where
Wm(qi, qj) := qi(1− qj). (22)
With these transition rates, the master equation for the probability distribution
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P (n, t) on the population configuration n = (n1, n2, · · · , nM) is written as
∂tP (n, t) =
M∑
i=1
{
λW+
(
ni − 1
Np
)
P (n− ei, t) + λW−
(
ni + 1
Np
)
P (n+ ei, t)
−
[
λW+
(
ni
Np
)
+ λW−
(
ni
Np
)]
P (n, t)
}
+
∑
〈i,j〉
[
σWm
(
ni + 1
Np
,
nj − 1
Np
)
P (n+ ei − ej, t)
−σWm
(
ni
Np
,
nj
Np
)
P (n, t)
]
, (23)
where 〈i, j〉 indicates neighbouring patches, and
ei := (0, · · · , 0,
i
1˘, 0, · · · , 0). (24)
3.2. Dynamics of the expectation value
In this section, we derive a differential equation for the expectation values of ni,
and examine its steady solutions and their stability, which play an important role in
understanding the transitions between metastable states in the spatial model.
3.2.1. Deterministic equations Let 〈ni〉 be the expectation value of ni. Then, 〈ni〉
(i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}) obey
d〈ni〉
dt
= λW+(〈ni〉/Np)− λW−(〈ni〉/Np)
+ σWm(〈ni+1〉/Np, 〈ni〉/Np) + σWm(〈ni−1〉/Np, 〈ni〉/Np)
− σWm(〈ni〉/Np, 〈ni+1〉/Np)− σWm(〈ni〉/Np, 〈ni−1〉/Np). (25)
By introducing new variables qi := ni/Np (the proportion of A individuals in the ith
patch) and a rescaled time τ := λt/Np, we obtain
d〈qi〉
dτ
= W+(〈qi〉)−W−(〈qi〉) + σ
λ
(〈qi+1〉+ 〈qi−1〉 − 2〈qi〉) . (26)
In this paper, we assume σ ≫ λ, i.e. migration processes occur sufficiently faster
than strategy update processes. Under this assumption, 〈qi〉 changes smoothly as a
function of i, and can be expressed by a function of a continuum spatial degree of
freedom x:
q(x, τ) := 〈qx
l
(τ)〉 (x ∈ [0, L˜]). (27)
The second term on the right hand side of (26) is approximated by D∂2q/∂ξ2, where
D := σl2/λ is a diffusion constant. By introducing the dimensionless space variable
ξ := x/
√
D, we arrive at the following reaction diffusion equation:
∂q(ξ, τ)
∂τ
=
∂2q(ξ, τ)
∂ξ2
+W+(q(ξ, τ))−W−(q(ξ, τ)) (ξ ∈ [0, L]) , (28)
where L := L˜/
√
D is the rescaled system size.
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Figure 7. Steady solutions of (28). Left: A “phase portrait” of (29). The solid lines
represent critical nuclei. The color bar denotes the value of E defined in (30). Right:
A critical nucleus (L = 40). Lc is the typical scale of a critical nucleus. Parameters:
a − c = 0.4, d − b = 1.0, w = 0.8, µA = µB = 0.005 (Lc ≃ 13.5 and V (q1) > V (q3)
in this case). The critical nuclei were numerically calculated by applying Newton’s
method to a discretized version of (29).
3.2.2. Steady solutions During the analysis of the well-mixed model discussed in section
2, fixed points and their stability played important roles. In the spatial model, steady
solutions will play similar roles.
Let qs(·) be a steady solution of (28). qs obeys an ordinary differential equation
d2qs(ξ)
dξ2
+W+(qs(ξ))−W−(qs(ξ)) = 0. (29)
Integrating this equation yields
1
2
(
dqs(ξ)
dξ
)2
+ V (qs(ξ)) = const. =: E, (30)
V (q) :=
∫ q
0
[W+(q
′)−W+(q′)] dq′. (31)
By regarding ξ as the “time”, we can describe qs as a coordinate of a particle moving in
one dimension, subjected to potential V . Hence, the trajectories of qs on the (q, dq/dξ)
plane can be expressed by the contours of “energy” E defined in (30) (dotted lines in the
left panel of figure 7). Because of the periodic boundary condition qs(ξ +L) = qs(ξ), qs
must be a closed orbit or a point on the (q, dq/dξ) plane. Therefore, the steady solutions
must be
(a) uniform solutions: qs(ξ) ≡ qi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) (recall that qi are the solutions of
W+(q)−W−(q) = 0 defined in section 2.2) or
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(b) non-uniform periodic solutions: closed orbits surrounding q2.
First, we consider the uniform solutions, which always exist regardless of system
size L. Because W ′+(q)−W ′−(q) is negative for q1, q3 and positive for q2 (see figure 1),
two solutions, qs(ξ) ≡ q1 and qs(ξ) ≡ q3, are linearly stable, and qs(ξ) ≡ q2 is linearly
unstable; the former solutions correspond to the two metastable states, whereas the
latter solution corresponds to the “marginal” state located at the boundary q2, below
which the system goes to q1 and above which the system goes to q3.
Next, we examine the properties of the non-uniform solutions. The forms of these
solutions depend on the system size L, because the period of the solution must coincide
with L:
2
∫ qmax
qmin
dq√
2(E − V (q)) = L. (32)
Here, qmin and qmax are the minimum and the maximum of q in the trajectory, which
is determined by E. The left panel of figure 7 show the phase portrait for the case of
V (q1) > V (q3), where the non-uniform solution in the limit of L → ∞ corresponds to
the homoclinic orbit starting from q3 and ending at q3 (the blue line in the figure). The
right panel of figure 7 shows the spatial profile of a non-uniform solution for the same
parameter set as the left panel. As can be seen from the figure, the solution represents
a “nucleus” of B individuals surrounded by a region dominated by A individuals. Note
that for the opposite case (i.e. V (q1) < V (q3)), the form of the non-uniform solution
becomes “upside down” of the right panel of figure 7, i.e. it represents a nucleus of A
individuals surrounded by a region dominated by B individuals.
It can be shown that the obtained non-uniform solutions are unstable, i.e. even an
infinitesimally small perturbation drives the system away from the non-uniform solutions
and toward the stable states q1 or q3 (see Appendix B). Because of such “critical”
behaviour, these non-uniform steady solutions are called “critical nuclei” [36], and we
denote them by qcn.
As L decreases, both qmin and qmax approach q2, and at a critical length Lc, they
coalesce with q2. This indicates that critical nuclei do not exist when L is smaller than
Lc, which is calculated, by linearizing (29) around q2, as
Lc =
2pi√
W ′+(q2)−W ′−(q2)
. (33)
Lc gives the characteristic length scale of the critical nuclei and plays an important
role in considering the spatial effect on the transitions between metastable states as
discussed later in section 4.
3.3. Transitions between metastable states
As shown in the previous section, the spatial model considered deterministically has
two stable steady solutions, i.e. the uniform solutions qs(ξ) ≡ q1 and qs(ξ) ≡ q3, which
we henceforth simply call q1 and q3, respectively. If stochasticity is taken into account,
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these solutions correspond to metastable states: although the system stays at q1 or q3
for an extremely long time, it occasionally undergoes transitions from one state to the
other as a result of large stochastic fluctuations. In this section, we evaluate the lifetimes
of these metastable states. We show the calculation of the lifetime of q3 (the lifetime of
q1 can be calculated in the same manner).
3.3.1. Path integral expression To evaluate the lifetime of a metastable state q3, we
calculate Pq3,sp(T ), the probability that the system stays around q3 from τ = 0 to
τ = T (≫ 1) without ever visiting the other metastable state q1. Pq3,sp(T ) decays
exponentially with T , and the inverse of the decay rate gives the lifetime of q3.
The path integral formalism, which was applied to the well-mixed model in section
2, is also applicable to the spatial model (see Appendix A for the detail). Pq3,sp can be
approximated by the probability that q(·, T ) = q3 and q(·, τ) 6= q1 (∀τ ∈ [0, T ]) given
that q(·, 0) = q3. By adopting continuum description assuming σ ≫ λ and using
a dimensionless spatial coordinate ξ := jl/
√
D (j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}) and the rescaled
system size L := L˜/
√
D, we obtain
Pq3,sp(T ) ≃
∫ ′
q(·,0)=q3,q(·,T )=q3
DqDp exp
(
−Np
√
σ
λ
S[q(·, ·), p(·, ·)]
)
, (34)
S[q(·, ·), p(·, ·)] :=
∫ T
0
dτ
∫ L
0
dξ {p(ξ, τ)∂τq(ξ, τ)− h[q(·, ·), p(·, ·)](ξ, τ)} , (35)
h[q(·, ·), p(·, ·)](ξ, τ) := h0(q(ξ, τ), p(ξ, τ))
−{[∂ξq(ξ, τ)][∂ξp(ξ, τ)]− q(ξ, τ)[1− q(ξ, τ)][∂ξp(ξ, τ)]2} , (36)
h0(q, p) := (e
p − 1)W+(q) + (e−p − 1)W−(q), (37)
where the prime in the path integral indicates the restriction to paths that satisfy
q(·, τ) 6= q1 (∀τ ∈ [0, T ]).
3.3.2. Semiclassical approximation The semiclasslcal approximation can be applied in
almost the same manner as was performed in section 2.3.2 for the well-mixed model.
We consider a stationary solution of the action represented by (35). The stationary
condition δS = 0 leads to partial differential equations
∂τq = e
pW+(q)− e−pW−(q) +
[
∂2ξ q − 2q(1− q)∂2ξp− 2(1− 2q)(∂ξp)(∂ξq)
]
, (38)
∂τp = − (ep − 1)W ′+(q)− (e−p − 1)W ′−(q)−
[
∂2ξp+ (1− 2q)(∂ξp)2
]
. (39)
subjected to a boundary condition q(·, 0) = q(·, T ) = q3. Note that when p = 0, the
equation for q coincides with (28), i.e. the equation for the expectation value.
We now calculate Pq3,sp(T ) (T ≫ 1) by considering solutions to the equations of
motion (38) and (39), under the boundary condition q(ξ, 0) = q(·, T ) = q3, and the
restriction that q never visits q1. Unlike the well-mixed model, it is not easy to obtain
such solutions in the spatial model. However, we can infer qualitative features of these
solutions from the analysis of the well-mixed model, where the solution is composed of
two trajectories: a trajectory moving from q3 to q2 in the p < 0 region and a trajectory
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Figure 8. Schematic representation of bounce solutions. Left: a uniform bounce
solution α. The system changes from q3 to q2 and returns back to q3 uniformly in
space. Right: a nonuniform bounce solution β. The system changes from q3 to qcn and
returns back to q3.
moving from q2 to q3 in the p = 0 region (see section 2.3.2, figure 3 right panel). Note
that the unstable fixed point q2 plays the role of a “watershed”, i.e. a dividing point
between the two stable states q1 and q3. In the spatial model, there are two kinds
of unstable solutions: (a) the uniform solution q(ξ) ≡ q2 and (b) the critical nucleus.
Therefore, it is inferred that there are two kinds of bounce solutions:
(a) a solution which is initially q(ξ) ≡ q3, then changes into q(ξ) ≡ q2, and finally
returns to q(ξ) ≡ q3 (see figure 8 left panel), and
(b) a solution which is initially q(ξ) ≡ q3, then changes into q = qcn, and finally returns
to q(ξ) ≡ q3 (see figure 8 right panel).
We call the former a “uniform bounce solution” (or solution α) and the latter a “non-
uniform bounce solution” (or solution β). It is clear that the nonuniform bounce solution
exists only when L > Lc.
Let Sα,q3 and Sβ,q3 be the action of the bounce solutions α and β calculated from
(35) - (37). If L < Lc, α is the only possible bounce solution. Hence, Pq3,sp(T ) is
calculated to be
Pq3,sp(T ) ≃ exp
(
−Kα,q3e−Np
√
σ
λ
Sα,q3 T
)
, (40)
where Kα,q3 is a prefactor determined by the Gaussian integrals around the stationary
solution α. Then, τq3,sp, the lifetime of the metastable state q3 can be expressed as
τq3,sp ≃ K−1α,q3 exp
(
Np
√
σ/λSα,q3
)
. If L > Lc, there are bounce solutions α and β. By
summing up all the contributions from these two bounce solutions, we obtain
Pq3,sp(T ) ≃
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
n∑
k=0
nCk
∫ T
0
dt1 · · ·
∫ T
0
dtn
×
(
−Kα,q3e−Np
√
σ
λ
Sα,q3
)k (
−Kβ,q3e−Np
√
σ
λ
Sβ,q3
)n−k
(41)
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= exp
[
−
(
Kα,q3e
−Np
√
σ
λ
Sα,q3 +Kβ,q3e
−Np
√
σ
λ
Sβ,q3
)
T
]
, (42)
where Kα,q3 and Kβ,q3 are prefactors determined by the Gaussian integrals around α
and β respectively. Then,
1
τq3,sp
≃ Kα,q3e−Np
√
σ
λ
Sα,q3 +Kβ,q3e
−Np
√
σ
λ
Sβ,q3 . (43)
holds. Under the condition Np
√
σ/λ ≫ 1 assumed in this paper, the lifetime is well-
approximated by one of the two terms, which has the smaller value of the action. Let γ
be either α or β, which corresponds to the smaller value of action (e.g. if Sα,q3 > Sβ,q3,
then γ = β. In fact, for the case treated in the next section, we obtain γ = β). Then,
we obtain τq3,sp ≃ K−1γ,q3 exp
(
Np
√
σ/λSγ,q3
)
. Thus, the expression for the lifetime is
summarized as
τq3,sp ≃


1
Kα,q3
exp
(
Np
√
σ
λ
Sα,q3
)
(for L < Lc)
1
Kγ,q3
exp
(
Np
√
σ
λ
Sγ,q3
)
(for L > Lc)
. (44)
3.4. Results
To discuss the L dependence of the lifetimes, we numerically calculated the action of
the bounce solutions (see Appendix C for the detail). If two kinds of bounce solutions
exist (i.e. if L > Lc), we choose the one with the smaller action. The obtained action is
denoted by Sqi,sp (i ∈ {1, 3}).
Figure 9 shows the L dependence of the action calculated in this manner for a
specific parameter set, for which V (q1) > V (q3) holds. If L < Lc, both Sq1,sp(L) and
Sq3,sp(L) increase linearly with the system size L. A different feature appears when the
system size exceeds the threshold length Lc, where the nonuniform bounce solutions
become important; Sq3,sp is now independent of L, whereas Sq1,sp continues increasing
with L. Detailed discussion and intuitive meaning of these results are given in the next
section.
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Figure 9. L dependence of the action. Left: Sq1,sp, action of the bounce solutions
that determine the lifetime of q1. Right: Sq3,sp, action of the bounce solutions that
determine the lifetime of q3. The dashed line denotes Lc. Sq1,sp keeps increasing with
L, whereas Sq3,sp takes constant value when L > Lc. Parameters: a− c = 0.4, d− b =
1.0, w = 0.8, µA = µB = 0.005. For this parameter set, Lc ≃ 13.5 and V (q1) > V (q3)
hold.
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4. Comparison and discussion
In this section, we discuss the spatial effect on the transitions between metastable states
by comparing the result of the well-mixed model (section 2) and that of the spatial model
(section 3).
In section 4.1, we discuss qualitative difference in the population size dependence of
the lifetimes between these two studied models. In section 4.2, we present an intuition
that explains the difference based on a “nucleation” process. In these two sections, we
restrict ourselves to the case in which V (q1) > V (q3) unless otherwise specified (for
the opposite case, the same discussion holds by exchanging q1 and q3). In section 4.3,
the parameter dependence of the characteristic length scale Lc is discussed in detail.
Section 4.4 is devoted to the interpretation of the spatial effect in terms of migration
rate. We close this section with a remark on which metastable state is long-lived.
4.1. Spatial effect on strategy selection
First, we summarize the results for the well-mixed model (section 2). For the
evolutionary game dynamics considered here (coordination games with mutations), there
are two metastable states denoted by q1 and q3, where q ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of
A individuals in the system; the state q1 corresponds to the population dominated by
strategy B, and q3 corresponds to the one dominated by strategy A. Although the system
spends an extremely long time at q1 or q3, it can undergo a transition from one state
to the other, via an unstable state q2 (satisfying q1 < q2 < q3). The lifetime of the
metastable states q1 and q3 are calculated to be
τqi,wm ∼ exp(NSqi,wm) (i ∈ {1, 3}), (45)
where Sq1,wm and Sq3,wm are the action of the bounce solution defined by (21) and (17),
respectively. Because Sq1,wm and Sq3,wm are positive and independent of N , the lifetimes
τqi,wm increases exponentially with the population size N .
Next, we summarize the results for the spatial model (section 3). The lifetimes of
the metastable states q1 and q3 in the spatial model are evaluated to be
τqi,sp ∼ exp
(
Np
√
σ
λ
Sqi,sp(L)
)
(i ∈ {1, 3}), (46)
where Sq1,sp and Sq3,sp are the positive functions of the system size L = M
√
λ/σ, and Np
is the population number per patch. Note that L is proportional to the total population
number NpM , where M is the number of patches. As discussed in section 3.2.2, the
spatial model has a characteristic length scale Lc. For small systems (L < Lc), Sq3,sp
grows linearly with L, whereas for large systems (L > Lc), it becomes independent of L
(see the right panel of figure 9). Then, from (46) one can conclude that the lifetime τq3,sp
grows exponentially with L for L < Lc, while it is independent of L for L > Lc. In other
words, while the model is effectively well-mixed when L < Lc, it behaves differently
from the well-mixed model when L > Lc. We stress that this difference is quite drastic
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due to the large factor Np
√
σ/λ (≫ 1) appearing in (46). On the other hand, Sq1,sp
has linear dependence on L for both L < Lc and L > Lc (see the left panel of figure
9). This implies that there is no qualitative difference in the system size dependence of
τq1,sp between the two regions L < Lc and L > Lc, which is in clear contrast to what is
observed for τq3,sp.
Note that the difference between the lifetimes of q1 and q3 originates from that of
V (q1) and V (q3), where V is defined in (31). If V (q1) < V (q3) (the opposite situation to
the above discussion), the role of q1 and q3 are reversed so that the lifetime of q1 takes
constant value for L > Lc while the lifetime of q3 keeps growing (the intuitive reason
for this behaviour is given in the next subsection). The condition V (q1) > V (q3) (resp.
V (q1) < V (q3)) can be rewritten as A1 > A3 (resp. A1 < A3), where
A1 := −
∫ q2
q1
[W+(q)−W−(q)]dq > 0, (47)
A3 :=
∫ q3
q2
[W+(q)−W−(q)]dq > 0. (48)
Note that A1 and A3 correspond to the two areas enclosed by the curve W+(q)−W−(q)
and the horizontal axis in figure 1. Without mutation (µA = µB = 0), the condition
A1 > A3 (resp. A1 < A3) is clearly related to the condition q2 > 1/2 (resp. q2 < 1/2),
where q2 = (d − b)/(a − c + d − b), because W+(q) −W−(q) is a cubic function of q.
Thus, the condition V (q1) > V (q3) (resp. V (q1) < V (q3)) is equivalent to d− b > a− c
(resp. d − b < a − c). With small mutation, although the precise condition is slightly
modified, the above discussion still holds approximately.
The observation above shows that (in the limit of small mutation ), the lifetimes of
the metastable states are simply characterized by the relative size of a−c and d−b in the
original game (1). The value a−c (> 0) measures the coordination advantage of playing
A over playing B when matched with an A individual. Similarly, the value d− b (> 0)
measures the coordination advantage of playing B over playing A when matched with
a B individual. The strategy with the larger (resp. smaller) coordination advantage is
called a “risk-dominant” (resp. “risk-dominated”) strategy in game theory [4] (e.g. if
d− b > a− c, strategy B is risk-dominant and strategy A is risk-dominated). Therefore,
our results are summarized as follows: the lifetime of the metastable state of the risk-
dominant strategy keeps growing exponentially with the system size, while that of the
risk-dominated one saturates after the system size hits a certain threshold. Hence (when
the system is sufficiently large) spatial structure drastically accelerates the selection for
the strategy with a larger coordination advantage (=risk-dominant strategy), facilitates
its invasion against a risk-dominated strategy, and gives a prediction of how natural
selection resolves coordination problems in biology.
Similar spatial effect has already been found by Ellison for an evolutionary game
model (Theorem 3 in [22]). However, direct comparison with his result is not appropriate
because his model assumes one individual per each patch, while our model assumes
Np(≫ 1) individuals per patch.
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(a)L < Lc
(b)The transition from q3 to q1
when L > Lc
(c)The transition from q1 to q3
when L > Lc
Figure 10. Schematic figures illustrating the transition between metastable states
in the spatial model when V (q1) > V (q3). Red and blue circles represent A and
B individuals, respectively. (a) In the well-mixed model or the spatial model for
L < Lc, transition between metastable states requires the whole system to change
(almost uniformly) to cross the dividing point q2. In the spatial model for L > Lc,
the transition can be triggered by crossing critical nucleus: (b) For transition from q3
to q1 to occur, only a part of the system, whose length scale is approximately Lc, has
to change. (c) For transition from q1 to q3 to occur, almost the whole system has to
change.
4.2. The origin of the spatial effect: an intuition
Here we intuitively discuss the origin of the qualitative differences in the system size
dependence of the lifetimes between the well-mixed model and the spatial model. We
first point out that during the transition from one metastable state to the other, the
system must cross a “dividing point”, which is a marginal unstable steady solution
of the system located between two metastable states. Once the system has crossed
this dividing point, it evolves with very high probability along “deterministic” path
(the trajectory of the expectation value satisfying (9) or (28)), which quickly carries the
system to the other metastable state. This view implies that the lifetime of a metastable
state is mostly determined by the difficulty of crossing a dividing point from a given
metastable state. Then, the system size dependence of the lifetimes can be intuitively
explained as follows (again, we restrict our consideration to the case V (q1) > V (q3)):
• In the well-mixed model or the spatial model for L < Lc, the unstable state q2
plays the role of a dividing point. To make a transition from one metastable state
to the other, the entire system has to cross the dividing point q2 (figure 10(a)).
As the system size increases, the probability that the system changes from a given
metastable state to the dividing point decays exponentially with N (or L), resulting
in the exponential dependence of the lifetimes on N (or L).
• In the spatial model for L > Lc, the critical nucleus also plays the role of a dividing
point. This indicates that the transition from one metastable state to the other
can be caused by “nucleation”, i.e. transition via the critical nucleus. The details
of the nucleation process depend on the direction of transition.
– For a transition from q3 to q1 to occur, it is sufficient for the system to change
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from q3 to the critical nucleus, which means that the change of only a part of
the system, whose length scale is approximately Lc, is sufficient (see figure 10
(b) and the spatial form of the critical nucleus in the right panel of figure 7
). The difficulty of this change does not depend on L, and hence neither does
the difficulty of transition from q3 to q1. Therefore, the lifetime of q3 does not
grow with L.
– For a transition from q1 to q3 to occur, it is necessary for the system to change
from q1 to the critical nucleus, which means that almost the entire system has
to change (figure 10(c)). This change becomes more difficult as L grows, and so
does the transition from q1 to q3. Hence, the lifetime of q1 grows exponentially
with L.
It should be noted that the existence of two kinds of transition paths (shown in figure
10) is directly related to the two kinds of bounce solutions, i.e. the uniform bounce
solution and the non-uniform bounce solution discussed in section 3.3.2. We stress that
the essential change of the transition process is described by the change in the bounce
solutions.
Note that when V (q1) < V (q3), the behaviour of the lifetime of q1 and q3 is reversed.
This is because the form of critical nucleus becomes “upside down” compared with right
panel of figure 7, so that the role of strategy A (red) and B (blue) in figure 10 should
be replaced by each other.
To confirm the intuition described above, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation
of the spatial model, specified by the master equation (23) employing the Gillespie
algorithm [39]. Figure 11 shows results of the simulation. For a small system (the upper
panel, L < Lc), the transition from one metastable state (the red region) to the other
state (the blue region) occurs almost uniformly. For a large system (the lower panel,
L > Lc), however, the transition proceeds via nucleation; transition occurs first in a
small region and then it spreads over the whole system.
We point out that the intuition presented above suggests the generality of our
results; although we have demonstrated spatial effect on bistable evolutionary games
with a specific update rule, the qualitative behaviour of the lifetimes is expected to be
the same for models with other update rules as long as the underlying evolutionary
game is bistable. This is because our results rely on the presence of a critical nucleus
(which has a characteristic length scale Lc), which in turn originates from the structure
of the phase portrait (see figures 1 and 7). It can be easily shown that models with
other update rules (e.g. a pairwise comparison process with other form of p(∆Π) or the
Moran process) also generate phase portraits with the same structure as figures 1 and
7, provided that payoff matrix elements satisfy (3) and mutation rates are sufficiently
small.
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Figure 11. Results of Monte Carlo simulation of master equation (23). Top: M = 35,
Bottom: M = 140. The color shows the number of A individuals in each patch
(Np = 40). Parameters: Np = 40, a − c = 0.4, d − b = 1.0, w = 0.1, µA = µB =
0.005, λ = Np, σ = 2Np (for a detailed description of the parameters, see section 2.1
and 3.1). For this parameter set, Npq1 ≃ 1.01, Npq3 ≃ 36.8 and Lc ≃ 50.1 (from (49)).
In terms of the patch number M , Lc ≃ 50.1 is equivalent to Mc :=
√
σ/λLc ≃ 70.8.
It can be seen that for a small system (the upper figure, M < Mc), the transition
process proceeds almost uniformly in space, while in a large system (the lower figure,
M > Mc), the transition starts from a small region and then spread across the whole
system (nucleation), as explained in figure 10.
4.3. Characteristic length scale Lc
The characteristic length Lc in the spatial model is an important quantity that
determines the population size dependence of the lifetimes. In this section, we discuss
its parameter dependence in detail. The characteristic length Lc is calculated in section
3.2.2, and is given by
Lc =
2pi√
W ′+(q2)−W ′−(q2)
. (49)
To observe the parameter dependence more clearly, we derive an approximate
expression for Lc: because q1, q2 and q3 are the solutions of the cubic equation
W+(q)−W+(q) = 0, we obtain an alternative expression for W+(q)−W−(q) (see (10)):
W+(q)−W−(q) = −w
(
1− µA + µB
2
)
(a− b− c+ d)(q − q1)(q − q2)(q − q3). (50)
By using (49), we obtain
Lc = 2pi
/√
w
(
1− µA + µB
2
)
(a− b− c + d)(q3 − q2)(q2 − q1) . (51)
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Figure 12. w dependence of Lc (a − c = 0.4, d − b = 1.0, µA = µB = 0.005). circle:
equation (49), solid line: approximate expression (52).
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
a−c
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
d
−b
Lc
12.500
15.000
17.500
20.000
12.0
13.5
15.0
16.5
18.0
19.5
21.0
22.5
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
a−c
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
d
−b
Lc
12.500
15.000
17.500
20.000
12.0
13.5
15.0
16.5
18.0
19.5
21.0
Figure 13. payoffmatrix dependence of Lc (w = 0.8, µA = µB = 0.005) Left: equation
(49), Right: approximate expression (52)
Assuming that µA and µB are sufficiently small, we arrive at a concise approximate form
Lc ≃ 2pi
√
1
w
(
1
a− c +
1
d− b
)
, (52)
from which we can conclude that Lc decreases with w, a− c and d− b.
Figure 12 shows the w dependence of Lc, where the circles and solid line denote the
results obtained from numerical evaluation of (49) and the approximate expression (52),
respectively. One can see that the present approximation works well as w increases.
Figure 13 shows the payoff matrix dependence of Lc; the left and right panels are
obtained from the numerical evaluation of (49) and the approximate expression (52),
respectively. One can see that Lc decreases as a − c and d − b increases, and that the
approximate expression (52) captures the qualitative feature well.
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4.4. Migration rate dependence
For comparison with a real systems, it is important to judge whether the system under
consideration can be regarded as well-mixed or spatial. In this section, we show the
criterion in terms of migration rate σ, and examine the effect of σ on the lifetimes of
the metastable states.
As was pointed out in section 4.1, the system is effectively well-mixed if L < Lc.
Because L is defined by L := L˜/
√
D = M
√
λ/σ (M : the number of patches), the
condition L < Lc is equivalent to
M <
√
σ
λ
Lc. (53)
Note that Lc depends only on game theoretical parameters given in table 1 but not on
σ or λ (see (49)). Therefore, in terms of the migration rate σ, the system is effectively
well-mixed if
σ/λ > M2/L2c , (54)
i.e. if the ratio between migration rate and update rate is larger than the value
determined by M and game theoretical parameters. On the other hand, when σ is
small so that (54) is not satisfied, the system should be described as the spatial model.
Then, the transition between the metastable states is affected by the nucleation process
described in section 4.2.
Finally, we discuss the σ dependence of the lifetimes of the metastable states. We
focus on the exponents of the lifetimes
Np
√
σ
λ
Sqi,sp
(
M
√
λ
σ
)
(55)
(see (46) ). The lifetimes take constant values when σ is large so that (54) is satisfied,
i.e. when the system is effectively well-mixed. This is because Sqi,sp(L) grows linearly
with L when L < Lc, and therefore factors depending on σ cancel out (see (55)).
When σ becomes smaller than the critical value in (54), the lifetimes decrease as
σ decreases. Thus, it can be concluded that spatial structure accelerates transition
between metastable states, leading to drastic reduction of the lifetimes compared with
those for the well-mixed model.
4.5. Which is the long-lived metastable state?
When we study coordination games, it is important to determine which metastable
state has the longer lifetime because it gives a criterion for which one of A and B is
better off [17]. We briefly discuss the spatial effect on this problem.
For the well-mixed model, the metastable state with the larger value of action Sqi,wm
has the longer lifetime as can be seen from (45). For the spatial model with a sufficient
size (L > Lc), on the other hand, the metastable state with the larger value of potential
V (qi) has the longer lifetime (see section 3.4 and 4.1).
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In the limit of small mutation rates (µA, µB → 0), it can be easily shown that
these two conditions coincide: V (q1) > V (q3) and Sq1,wm > Sq3,wm are, respectively,
equivalent to the condition d − b > a − c, suggesting that the risk-dominant strategy
has the longer lifetime, which is consistent with previous studies [17, 22]. However, in
the presence of asymmetric mutation (µA, µB > 0, µA 6= µB), the conditions are not
necessarily equivalent. This observation indicates that long-lived metastable state may
switch from one state to the other as the system size increases. Detailed discussion is
left for a future study.
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5. Summary
In this paper, we have evaluated the lifetimes of metastable states in bistable
evolutionary games by utilizing the path integral method and the semiclassical
approximation. It has been shown that spatial structure qualitatively changes the
system size dependence of the lifetimes of the metastable states: For the model without
spatial structure (the well-mixed model), we have shown that the lifetimes of the
metastable states grow exponentially with the total population size N . On the other
hand, for the model with spatial structure (the spatial model), we have shown that there
exists a threshold length Lc across which the system size L(∝ the total population size)
dependence of the lifetimes changes. For L < Lc, the lifetimes of the two metastable
states grow exponentially with the system size, whereas for L > Lc, the lifetime
of one metastable state remains constant, while that of the other continues growing
exponentially with L. This significant change in the system size dependence can be
intuitively explained by the presence of critical nuclei; for large systems (L > Lc) the
transition is induced by “nucleation” via critical nuclei.
We stress that the present method allows semi-quantitative calculation of the
lifetimes taking into account large fluctuations. Although we considered specific models,
the present method can be easily applied to other models of the evolutionary game
theory. Extension toward evolutionary games on higher-dimensional lattices or complex
networks is an important future problem.
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Appendix A. Stochastic processes and path integral
In this appendix, we will derive a path integral expression for the transition probability
used in section 2.3.1 and 3.3.1. The derivation is based on [40].
We consider a general continuous time Markov process on the discrete states n ∈ N.
The rates at which processes n → n + r (r ∈ R ⊂ Z− {0}) occur are given by Wr(n).
By setting W±1(n) = W±(n/N) and Wr(n) = 0 (for |r| ≥ 2), we obtain the well-
mixed model discussed in section 2. Let t ∈ [0, T ] be time. Our aim is to calculate
p(nfin, T |nini, 0), the probability that n = nfin at t = T given that n = nini at t = 0
(other conditions can be added, such as restriction of the path).
First, we discretize the time interval [0, T ] into K(≫ 1) small fractions:
∆t := T/K, tj := j∆t, nj := n(tj) (j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K}), (A.1)
where n0 := nini and nK := nfin. Let P (∆n|n) be the probability that the system changes
from n to n+∆n in one discrete time step. Then, p(nfin, T |nini, 0) can be approximated
by
p(nfin, T |nini, 0)
≃
∞∑
n1,···,nK−1=0
P (n1 − n0|n0) · · ·P (nK − nK−1|nK−1)
=
∞∑
n1,···,nK−1=0
∑
∆n0,···,∆nK−1
K−1∏
j=0
δnj+1−nj ,∆njP (∆nj|nj)
=
∑
∆n0,···,∆nK−1
∫
dn1 · · · dnK−1
K−1∏
j=0
δ(nj+1 − nj −∆nj)P (∆nj|nj). (A.2)
By substituting
δ(nj+1 − nj −∆nj) =
∫ i∞
−i∞
dpj+1
2pii
epj+1(∆nj−nj+1+nj) (j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K − 1}), (A.3)
we obtain
p(nfin, T |nini, 0) ≃
∫
dn1 · · · dnK−1
∫
dp1
2pii
· · · dpK
2pii
× exp
[
−
K−1∑
j=0
pj+1(nj+1 − nj)
]
K−1∏
j=0
∑
∆nj
epj+1∆njP (∆nj |nj). (A.4)
Since ∑
∆nj
epj+1∆njP (∆nj |nj) =
∑
r∈R
erpj+1Wr(nj)∆t +
(
1−
∑
r∈R
Wr(nj)∆t
)
≃ exp
[∑
r∈R
(erpj+1 − 1)Wr(nj)∆t
]
, (A.5)
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holds for sufficiently small time interval ∆t, we arrive at
p(nfin, T |nini, 0) ≃∫ K−1∏
i=1
dni
∫ K∏
j=1
dpj
2pii
exp
{
−
K−1∑
k=0
[
pk+1(nk+1 − nk)−∆t
∑
r∈R
(erpk+1 − 1)Wr(nk)
]}
.(A.6)
Taking the limit K →∞ yields
p(nfin, T |nini, 0) =
∫
n(0)=nini,n(T )=nfin
DnDp exp(−S[n(·), p(·)]), (A.7)
S[n(·), p(·)] :=
∫ T
0
dt [p(t)∂tn(t)−H(n(t), p(t))] , (A.8)
H(n, p) :=
∑
r∈R
(erp − 1)Wr(n). (A.9)
The derivation for models with spatial degrees of freedom proceeds almost in
parallel with the derivation shown above. We consider one-dimensional array of M
patches with periodic boundary condition. The state of the system is specified by
n := (n1, n2, · · · , nM). We assume that local processes occur as specified above: the
process n→ n+ rei (r ∈ R ⊂ Z− {0}) occurs at rate Wr(ni), where
ei := (0, · · · , 0,
i
1˘, 0, · · · , 0). (A.10)
In addition to the local processes, we assume there are migration processes between
neighbouring patches: for |i − j| = 1, the process n → n − ei + ej occurs at rate
Wm(n
i, nj). By replicating the discussion above, we obtain
p(nfin, T |nini, 0) ≃
∫
dn1 · · · dnK−1
∫
dp1
2pii
· · · dpK
2pii
× exp
[
−
K−1∑
j=0
pj+1(nj+1 − nj)
]
K−1∏
j=0
∑
∆nj
epj+1∆njP (∆nj |nj). (A.11)
Since
epk+1∆nkP (∆nk|nk)
= ∆t
M∑
i=1
∑
r∈R
erp
i
k+1Wr(n
i
k) + ∆t
M∑
i,j=1,|i−j|=1
e−p
i
k+1
+pj
k+1Wm(n
i
k, n
j
k)
+

1−∆t M∑
i=1
∑
r∈R
Wr(n
i
k)−∆t
M∑
i,j=1,|i−j|=1
Wm(n
i
k, n
j
k)


≃ exp

∆t
M∑
i=1
∑
r∈R
(ep
i
k+1 − 1)Wr(nik) + ∆t
M∑
i,j=1,|i−j|=1
(e−p
i
k+1
+pj
k+1 − 1)Wm(nik, njk)

(A.12)
holds for sufficiently small ∆t, we arrive at
p(nfin, T |nini, 0) ≃
∫
dn1 · · · dnK−1
∫
dp1
2pii
· · · dpK
2pii
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× exp
{
−
K−1∑
k=0
[
pk+1(nk+1 − nk)−H(nk,pk+1)∆t
]}
, (A.13)
where
H(n,p) :=
M∑
i=1
∑
r∈R
(ep
i − 1)Wr(ni) +
M∑
i,j=1,|i−j|=1
(e−p
i+pj − 1)Wm(ni, nj). (A.14)
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Appendix B. Stability of non-uniform solutions
In this appendix, we outline the proof that a non-uniform steady solution for (28) is
unstable. Let qcn(·) be a non-uniform solution for (28). Linearization of (28) around qcn
by substituting q(ξ, τ) = qcn(ξ) + δq(ξ, τ) yields
∂τδq(ξ, τ) = Lδq(ξ, τ), L := ∂2ξ +W ′+(qcn(ξ))−W ′−(qcn(ξ)). (B.1)
If all the eigenvalues of L are negative, qcn is linearly stable, and otherwise qcn is linearly
unstable. It can be easily shown that δq0 := dqcn/dξ is an eigenfunction with zero
eigenvalue (called a zero mode) of L. Because δq0 has two nodes, one can show (with
the help of the theory of periodic Sturm-Liouville problems [43]) that there must be one
nodeless eigenmode with a positive eigenvalue. Hence, qcn is linearly unstable.
The above result indicates that a non-uniform steady solution represents a marginal
state located at the boundary between the metastable states q1 and q3. If a positive
perturbation δq(ξ)(> 0 for all ξ) is added to qcn, the system is driven toward q3
following the deterministic equation (28). On the other hand, if a negative perturbation
δq(ξ)(< 0 for all ξ) is added, the system is driven toward q1.
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Appendix C. Numerical calculation
In this appendix, we briefly describe the numerical method used to obtain the action of
the bounce solution in the spatial model (section 3.3.2). As in section 3.3.2, we calculate
bounce solutions that determines the lifetime of q3 (almost the same discussion applies
to q1) .
First, note that for both the solutions α and β, it is not necessary to consider the
second half of the transition (transition from q2 to q3 for the bounce solution α, and
transition from qcn to q3 for the bounce solution β) since p ≡ 0 for these trajectories
and hence they do not contribute to the action (see (35)-(37)). This is because they
corresponds to trajectories obeying the “deterministic” partial differential equation (28),
which can be obtained from (38) and (39) by setting p ≡ 0. Hence, it is sufficient to
consider the first half of the transition of the the bounce solutions α and β, which we
call solutions α′ and β ′ respectively, for the calculation of Sα(= Sα′) and Sβ(= Sβ′).
These solutions are obtained by solving the partial differential equations (38) and (39)
∂τq = F (q, p) +
[
∂2ξ q − 2q(1− q)∂2ξp− 2(1− 2q)(∂ξp)(∂ξq)
]
, (C.1)
∂τp = G(q, p)−
[
∂2ξ p+ (1− 2q)(∂ξp)2
]
, (C.2)
where F (q, p) := epW+(q)−e−pW−(q) and G(q, p) := −(ep−1)W ′+(q)− (e−p−1)W ′−(q),
subjected to boundary conditions
α′: q(ξ, 0) = q3 and q(ξ, T ) = q2 (∀ξ ∈ [0, L])
β ′: q(ξ, 0) = q3 and q(ξ, T ) = qcn(ξ) (∀ξ ∈ [0, L])
where T is taken to be sufficiently large (T ≫ 1). This problem was solved numerically
as follows.
We discretize time and space as
τi := i∆t, ∆t := T/NT (i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , NT − 1}) (C.3)
ξj := j∆x, ∆x := L/NL (j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , NL − 1}) (C.4)
q(ξj, τi)↔ qi,j, p(ξj, τi)↔ pi,j, (C.5)
where NT and NL are the division numbers of the time and spatial coordinates,
respectively. Note that q0,j , qNT−1,j (j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , NL − 1}) are given as the boundary
condition. We then discretize (C.1) and (C.2) into the following difference equations:
For i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NT − 2} , j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , NL − 1}
qi+1,j − qi−1,j
2∆t
= F (qi,j, pi,j)
+
[
qi,j+1 − 2qi,j + qi,j−1
(∆x)2
− 2(1− 2qi,j)qi,j+1 − qi,j−1
2∆x
· pi,j+1 − pi,j−1
2∆x
−2qi,j(1− qi,j)pi,j+1 − 2pi,j + pi,j−1
(∆x)2
]
(C.6)
pi+1,j − pi−1,j
2∆t
= G(qi,j , pi,j)
−
[
pi,j+1 − 2pi,j + pi,j−1
(∆x)2
+ (1− 2qi,j)(pi,j+1 − pi,j−1)
2
4(∆x)2
]
. (C.7)
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Figure C1. Bounce solutions which determine the lifetime of q3. Left: uniform bounce
solution α′ (L = 10.5). Right: nonuniform bounce solution β′ (L = 20.5). Parameters:
a− c = 0.4, d− b = 1.0, w = 0.8, µA = µB = 0.005. For this parameter set, Lc ≃ 13.5,
and fixed points are q1 = 0.0031, q2 = 0.72, q3 = 0.99.
For i = 0, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , NL − 1},
p1,j − p0,j
∆t
= G(q0,j , p0,j)
−
[
p0,j+1 − 2p0,j + p0,j−1
(∆x)2
+ (1− 2q0,j)(p0,j+1 − p0,j−1)
2
4(∆x)2
]
.(C.8)
For i = NT − 1, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , NL − 1},
pNT−1,j − pNT−2,j
∆t
= G(qNT−1,j , pNT−1,j)
−
[
pNT−1,j+1 − 2pNT−1,j + pNT−1,j−1
(∆x)2
+(1− 2qNT−1,j)
(pNT−1,j+1 − pNT−1,j−1)2
4(∆x)2
]
. (C.9)
The original problem of solving partial differential equations is now reduced to the
problem of finding zeros of a function f : R2NL(NT−1) → R2NL(NT−1). This problem
can be solved numerically by Newton’s method. Solving boundary value problems by
applying Newton’s method is called relaxation method [44].
Figure C1 shows the calculated bounce solutions which determine the lifetime of
q3. It can be easily seen from (38) and (39) that uniform bounce solution is the same
as activation trajectory of the well-mixed model. This is because, if q and p do not
depend on ξ, (38) and (39) coincide with the equations of motion for the well-mixed
model (14) and (15), respectively. Bounce solutions which determine the lifetime of q1
can be calculated in almost the same way by changing the boundary conditions, and
are shown in figure C2.
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Figure C2. Bounce solutions which determine the lifetime of q1. Left: uniform bounce
solution (L = 10.5). Right: nonuniform bounce solution (L = 20.5). Parameters:
a− c = 0.4, d− b = 1.0, w = 0.8, µA = µB = 0.005. For this parameter set, Lc ≃ 13.5,
and fixed points are q1 = 0.0031, q2 = 0.72, q3 = 0.99.
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